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Divisions of labour: rethinking Europe’s migration policy
The European Union is confronted with major immigration challenges. There
are mounting immigration pressures from poorer countries, Europe is falling
behind in the global competition for talent and it also needs to sustain its
humanitarian commitment to accommodate refugees. Further, there are
major integration problems as the aspirations of second generation migrants
are often frustrated. Crucially, there is disagreement about what should be
done and at what level – EU or national? 
This Bruegel Blueprint attempts to answer these controversial questions
against the background of the European ‘pact on immigration’ set to be
adopted under the 2008 French EU presidency. It recommends that the EU
focus on high-skilled legal migration, irregular migration and humanitarian
migration while low-skilled legal immigration and integration policies should
remain a national remit. Among several specific proposals is a strengthening
of the EU ‘Blue Card’, a term originally coined by Bruegel and now a key part of
the EU policy debate on how best to attract skilled migrants to Europe.
Jakob von Weizsäcker is a research fellow at Bruegel. A migration policy
specialist, he coined the term 'Blue Card' for a European scheme to attract
high-skilled immigrants. He joined Bruegel from the World Bank in Washington
where he was Country Economist for Tajikistan. His research interests include
immigration, social insurance, ageing and economic development.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
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In their great book, Globalisation and History, economic historians Kevin O’Rourke
and Jeffrey Williamson reckon that migrations explain about two-third of the
Scandinavian countries’ nineteenth century catch-up (with respect to US income per
head) and roughly the entirety of that of Ireland and Italy. History reminds us that for
all that economists have written about the key role of international trade, in the first
round of globalisation the movement of people was a much bigger factor than the
movement of goods.  For a few decades this experience was forgotten. After the last
migration waves within and into Europe dried up or were stopped in the 1970s, it
became standard practice to assume that people do not move, at any rate that they
should not move. Economic policy in most cases took the immobility assumption for
granted and migration, or rather the prevention of it, became a topic for discussion
among interior ministers rather than economy ministers. Even the fall of the USSR
and German unification did not result in this assumption being durably challenged.   
Yet what was for some time perceived as the natural state of affairs did not survive
the century. In the US, which had remained an immigration country throughout, the
influx of immigrants, especially from Mexico, accelerated in the last decades of the
twentieth century. In post iron-curtain Europe, borders proved to be increasingly
porous. And by the mid-2000s it became clear that the migration effects of EU
enlargement would exceed by far what economists had forecasted.A growing number
of European countries – from Ireland to the UK and Spain – had opened their doors.
As a result, the Spanish demographic – and therefore economic – outlook changed
radically from decline to expansion in the course of a few years. At the same time, the
immigration stance in other EU countries which had been relatively open, such as the
Netherlands, became more restrictive in response to integration challenges. But can
one country open its doors while another one proceeds to shut them? With the EU’s
internal mobility agenda in the wake of enlargement settled, this question of immi-
gration from outside the EU is increasingly at the centre of discussion at the EU level.
So (im)migration is back on the European agenda. 
Yet Europeans remain unsure whether it is a blessing or a curse. They are evenunsure whether the migration issue should be approached from an economic or from
a law-and-order perspective. Member states exhibit very different – and somewhat
unstable – preferences, with some countries putting emphasis on the economic ben-
efits of migration and others adhering to a restrictive attitude. The European
Commission rightly argues that governments should agree on a common approach
but there is disagreement on what this approach should be. The stakes are thus high
for Europe as a whole and for its unity, and disagreements abound. 
Jakob von Weizsäcker, the author of this Blueprint, has already contributed several
Bruegel papers on the migration issue. In 2006 he coined the term ‘Blue Card’ and
proposed under this name a scheme to offer skilled migrants access to the entire EU
labour market. As someone who is well aware of the complexity of the issues and of
the limits of a purely economic approach, he is not offering the familiar economist’s
prescription – namely that migration is akin to trade and should therefore not be
resisted.  Rather, he wants to provide the building blocks for a better informed policy
debate that takes political constraints into account but does not overlook the eco-
nomic rationale.
In this Blueprint, Jakob von Weizsäcker therefore carefully discusses which aspects
of  this policy area belong to the member states and which belong to the Union, and
outlines do-able steps towards a common approach in the fields where action
belongs to the EU. His proposals regarding the appropriate division of labour are sim-
ple and concrete because he is persuaded that only simple and concrete ideas can
change the terms of the debate on what is a politically highly charged issue. He is
right. 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel
Brussels, October 2008
DIVISIONS OF LABOURFOREWORD
vExecutive summary
There are three main migration challenges for Europe: 
• Flow. Migratory pressure is on the increase as the populations of poorer countries
in the greater neighbourhood of the European Union become more mobile. 
• Stock. EU member states with a significant stock of immigrants are confronted
with a major integration challenge as the aspirations of many second-generation
migrants are frustrated by poor education and poor labour market performance. If
integration policies fail, large ethnic underclasses may become a permanent fea-
ture in the EU.
• Talent. Global competition for high-skilled workers has intensified owing to skill-
biased technological change and globalisation, and the EU struggles to attract and
retain top talent. With the internal mobility agenda in the aftermath of EU enlarge-
ment settled for better or for worse, the time to address the external migration
challenge is now. 
But which part of these challenges needs to be addressed at the EU as opposed to the
national level? Ultimately, this is the key question underlying the current debate on
the ’pact on immigration‘ that is to be adopted during the French EU presidency. Past
experience shows that the development of a common European immigration policy
is, politically, a particularly difficult undertaking:
• History. There are major differences in tradition, outlook and migration experi-
ences between member states, so that preferences are diverse.
• Politics. Immigration continues to be a politically divisive subject within most
member states. As a consequence, national priorities can be volatile.
• Sovereignty. There is a natural reluctance to delegate decisions about who is
allowed to enter a country and who is not to the European level since such deci-
sions are often seen as one of the defining elements of national sovereignty. 
Bearing these difficulties in mind, three priority areas for EU policy action are
identified and concrete policy suggestions are developed: • High-skilled migration. For the EU successfully to participate in the global compe-
tition for talent, the Blue Card draft directive needs to be strengthened. In particu-
lar, the Blue Card needs to become more readily transferable so that it genuinely
offers access to the entire EU labour market. At the same time, concerns about
brain drain should be taken seriously, not least by offering developing countries
an opt-out clause. 
• Irregular migration. The EU agenda on irregular migration must be balanced to suc-
ceed. The currently envisaged efforts to reduce irregular migration through tighter
controls will only be able to slow the inflow of irregular migrants somewhat but will
not make the problem of irregular migration disappear. Therefore, it is proposed
that tighter controls should be combined with better humanitarian standards and
an agreement on continuous ‘earned regularisation’ as a realistic alternative to
sporadic mass regularisations.
• Asylum. Not least because of past coordination efforts, asylum applications in
Europe have dropped considerably in recent years while wars and political perse-
cution continue to make people flee their home countries on a large scale. In order
for Europe to help these refugees more effectively,  a ‘new Nansen’ scheme offer-
ing 25,000 additional humanitarian immigration slots per annum is proposed, the
funding and allocation of which are to be organised at the European level.
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21. Introduction
Europe’s migration challenge needs to be addressed with some urgency. There are
three main aspects of that challenge. First, migratory pressure is on the increase as
the populations of poorer countries in the greater neighbourhood of the EU become
more mobile. Second, EU member states with a significant stock of immigrants are
confronted with a major integration challenge as the aspirations of many second-
generation migrants are frustrated by poor education and poor labour market
performance. If integration policies fail, large ethnic underclasses may become a
permanent feature in the EU. Third, global competition for high-skilled workers has
intensified owing to skill-biased technological change and globalisation, and the EU
struggles to attract and retain top talent. With the internal mobility agenda in the
aftermath of EU enlargement settled for better or for worse, the time to address the
external migration challenge is now. 
Under the comprehensive Hague programme which extends until 2010, the EU is
already starting to develop a common European immigration policy. But progress to
date has been uneven and controversial, and the failed Irish referendum on the EU’s
Lisbon Treaty in early 2008 further delays the introduction of qualified majority vot-
ing on European immigration policy. In view of the urgency to make progress and the
difficulties encountered, the priority that the French Council presidency has given to
EU immigration policy in the form of the proposed ‘pact on immigration and asylum’
1
is welcome since it provides new momentum for the current legislative proposals and
stands to shape the EU’s next work programme on immigration beyond 2010.
This pact on immigration, set to be adopted by the European Council in October 2008,
is structured around the following five themes:
• Organising legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception
capacities determined by each member state, and to encourage integration.
1. See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/sep/eu-european-pact-on-immigration-and-asylum.pdf for a draft
version of the pact.• Controlling illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their
countries of origin or to a transit country.
• Making border controls more effective.
• Constructing a ‘Europe of asylum’.
• Creating a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in
order to encourage the synergy between migration and development.
As these broad-based headings indicate, the pact is set to continue the long-standing
tradition of arguing for a comprehensive approach to European migration policy. Past
experience shows that the development of a common European immigration policy
is, politically, a particularly difficult undertaking. There are several reasons for this.
First, there are major differences in tradition, outlook and migration experiences
between member states, so that preferences are diverse. Second, immigration con-
tinues to be a politically divisive subject within most member states. As a conse-
quence, national priorities can be volatile. Third, there is a natural reluctance to dele-
gate decisions about who is allowed to enter a country and who is not to the
European level since such decisions are often seen as one of the defining elements
of national sovereignty. In view of these difficulties and the prospect of further delay
in the introduction of qualified majority voting in this domain, protracted decision-
making and incremental progress towards a common migration policy will continue
to be the norm. 
When decision-making is so difficult, it becomes even more important for
policymakers carefully to prioritise their policy proposals, giving preference to the
most pressing and the least controversial rather than aiming for all-encompassing
comprehensive solutions. One of the underlying concerns of this paper is to examine
to what extent the agenda set out in the proposed ‘pact on migration’ might perhaps
need to be refined in order fully to reflect such a balanced and workable set of policy
priorities.
For which aspects of immigration policy is the need for a common European
approach most pressing? And which are the areas where immigration challenges
should continue to be dealt with at the national level, either permanently or at least
for the time being? In principle, policy areas where cross-border spillovers are limited
and national preferences are diverse should remain a national responsibility. By
contrast when cross-border spillovers are considerable, either policy coordination or
harmonisation is called for. Harmonisation tends to be a good solution when national
preferences are well aligned, while coordination is often more appropriate when
spillovers are major but national preferences are diverse. In the following, we attempt
4
DIVISIONS OF LABOUR INTRODUCTIONto apply these somewhat abstract notions of the subsidiarity principle in order to
identify priorities for a European immigration policy and to develop concrete policy
proposals. 
To prepare the ground for the analysis, the next section explores the migration status
quo in Europe both in a statistical sense, by providing basic immigration statistics,
and a policy sense by presenting the EU policy developments hitherto. The third sec-
tion then provides a simple analysis of the economic implications of immigration.
Finally, the fourth section identifies priority areas for EU immigration policy and gives
policy recommendations. 
5
DIVISIONS OF LABOUR INTRODUCTION2. Setting the stage
This section explores the immigration status quo within the EU
2. In the first part of
this section, the scale and structure of internal and external migration are explored,
making use of the available migration statistics showing that the different EU
member states have very different migration experiences. The second part then
attempts to capture the key aspects of the institutional arrangements that govern
migration within the EU and between the rest of the world and the EU.
Migration stocks and flows
Looking at migration stocks and flows in the EU, we first explore overall migration
patterns. After that, we attempt to disaggregate those numbers into different
categories, especially by skill, to obtain a more differentiated picture of intra-EU dif-
ferences. Finally, we explore the future migration potential from the EU’s greater
neighbourhood.
During the past decade, immigration to the fifteen old EU member states has
increased substantially, as illustrated in Figure 1. Spain experienced the most rapid
increase in the stock of foreign-born among OECD countries, adding nine percentage
points of foreign-born over the past decade. But Ireland (+7 percentage points),
Austria and the UK (both +3 percentage points) also experienced an uncommonly
rapid increase in their stock of foreign-born. And there are signs that even the twelve
new EU member states who joined the EU since 2004, many of which initially experi-
enced substantial migration outflows, are increasingly experiencing immigration
from poorer EU neighbourhood countries. 
2. This section is based on Brücker and Weizsäcker (2007).Figure 1: Stock of foreign-born in selected EU countries and the US between 1997
and 2006
Source: OECD
Compared to the US, a traditional immigration country, the EU15 are catching up fast
with respect to the stock of foreign-born as a proportion of the native population.
However, the differences in migration experiences among the EU15 remain large, let
alone among the EU27. To explore the potential for joint EU policies, we aim to explore
these immigration differences as they may have an important impact on policy pref-
erences. 
A simple migration typology of EU member states
The most important quantitative measures of migration are the stock and flow of
migrants. Using these, the migration experiences of member states can be described
by identifying six different categories as indicated in Figure 2. Those countries with a
high stock of migrants (above 10 percent of the total population) are grouped into
three different categories according to their net migration inflows. Dynamic immigra-
tion countries (Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, and Luxembourg) rapidly add to their already
elevated stock at net immigration rates of around eight per thousand per year.
Classic immigration countries (Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, France, and the
Netherlands) have low but positive immigration rates of around two per thousand per
7
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year. And legacy immigration countries (Estonia, Latvia) have experienced a large
influx of migrants in the historic (Soviet) past but are now experiencing modest net
emigration of around one per thousand per year. 
The EU countries with less than 10 percent foreign population are also grouped into
three categories. Emerging immigration countries (Portugal, Greece, Malta, UK,
Denmark, Italy) have net immigration inflows scattered around three per thousand
per year. Source countries(Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland) display net emigra-
tion of around one per thousand per year.  The remaining EU countries do not
currently display a very pronounced migration profile, with foreign populations below
10 percent and net immigration rates at around one per thousand per year. 
As a next step, we attempt a breakdown of migration by country of origin and by skill
level. We are forced to shift in migration definitions between foreign-born and foreign
citizens in the following owing to data limitations. The difference is significant as a
result of different approaches to naturalisation and differences in the numbers of
foreign-born expatriates returning home. Also, the numbers that we present have
different base years, which can lead to substantial deviations, especially for emerg-
ing and dynamic immigration countries where stocks have been rapidly increasing
over recent years. Despite these limitations that limit comparability, the breakdowns
yield important insights.
Decomposing immigration by country of origin
The stock of foreign citizens in the EU15 is made up of roughly six percent of the total
population of the EU15, as summarised in Table 1 (overleaf). It reveals a surprisingly
simple decomposition of the population with foreign citizenship by region of origin.
Roughly one third of foreign citizens in EU15 countries come from the EU27. One third
originates from the broad EU neighbourhood that includes the Balkans, Turkey, EU
neighbourhood countries around the Mediterranean and eastern Europe, and Russia.
The final third comes from the rest of the world. 
This also leads to an important observation regarding the historic propensity to
migrate to the EU15 from different regions. The EU27 and the EU neighbourhood have
a population of just below 500 million each. Since their contribution to foreign
residents in the EU15 is also comparable, the propensity of their inhabitants to
migrate to a (different) EU15 country is also comparable. Broadly speaking, this is
attributable to two factors. First, mobility inside the EU is not particularly high,
despite the absence of legal barriers, not least because of relatively small income10
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differentials. Second, mobility from the EU neighbourhood is significant, despite the
legal restrictions, not least because of geographic proximity and large income
differentials. 
Table 1: Foreign citizens in the EU15  by region of origin
(2005 or nearest available year)
* Neighouring regions: Balkan countries, Turkey, EU neighbourhood countries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, Russia.
Sources: Eurostat population statistics, European Labour Force Survey, authors’ calculations
The rest of the world has a population of just above five billion inhabitants. Hence the
implied propensity to migrate to the EU is only roughly one tenth of that from the
neighbourhood, with its 500 million inhabitants. This crude arithmetic confirms that
distance is an important determinant of migration. But he distinction between EU
neighbourhood and the rest of the world is evolving. Thus, there are two important
scenarios leading to greatly increased migration to Europe. First, the legal and de
facto barrier to migration from the EU neighbourhood might decrease. Second, a
number of countries in the greater EU neighbourhood that currently fall into the ‘rest
of the world’ category might increase their emigration rates to Europe to levels that
make them in effect EU neighbourhood countries for our purposes. In particular, this
might occur for a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East.
EU15 NMS12 EU27 Neighbouring
regions*
Rest of
world
Total
Foreign residents in % of total population
Austria 1.6 1.1 2.6 5.6 1.2 9.4
Belgium 5.5 0.1 5.6 2.1 0.9 8.6
Denmark 1.1 0.2 1.3 1.2 2.5 4.9
Finland 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.1
France 1.9 0.1 2.0 2.2 0.9 5.1
Germany 2.0 0.7 2.7 4.0 2.1 8.8
Greece 0.5 0.9 1.4 4.9 1.8 8.1
Ireland 1.8 n/a 1.8 n/a 4.4 6.2
Italy 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.9 1.4 4.1
Luxembourg 33.2 3.1 36.3 n/a 2.7 39.0
Netherlands 1.3 0.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 4.3
Portugal 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.6 2.3
Spain 1.5 1.0 2.5 1.5 3.9 7.8
Sweden 2.1 0.3 2.4 0.8 2.2 5.3
UK 1.6 0.2 1.8 0.2 3.1 5.0
EU15 1.6 0.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 6.2Of course, it should be borne in mind that this simple picture of migration to the EU15
is the outcome of very varied circumstances in different member states, as can be
seen by breaking down the data to the country level. For example, the bulk of foreign-
ers in the UK come from the rest of the world, which is largely the result of old colonial
ties. In Germany, the bulk of immigrants hail from the neighbourhood region, not
least due to Germany’s former guest-worker programme. And in Belgium foreign
citizens from the EU15 dominate in part because of the role of Brussels as the capital
of Europe.
One important aspect of immigration that is not properly captured by these statistics
is irregular migration. While precise numbers are not available for obvious reasons,
some four to eight million irregular migrants can be expected currently to be living in
the EU27, with as many as half a million arriving each year
3. It seems plausible that
that rising immigration pressure from the EU’s wider neighbourhood, detailed in the
section on proximity and income differences below, could result in further increases
in the stock and flow of illegal immigrants.
Decomposing immigration by skill
Another breakdown of migration that is critical to our argument is breakdown by skill
presented in Figure 3 (overleaf), which compares key immigration countries in
Europe with North America and Australia. It shows that classic immigration countries
such as Australia and Canada manage to attract a much higher proportion of skilled
immigrants than countries like France or Germany, both of which are well below the
OECD average with regard to their immigration skill-mix.
It is sometimes argued that Europe is not attracting high-skilled immigrants because
it already has enough high-skilled locals, whereas manual labour is lacking. However,
this does not seem plausible because the percentage of tertiary-educated is also
higher among Canadian and Australian natives than among EU natives. Are the skill
requirements of the Australian and Canadian economies really significantly higher
than in Europe?  
It would appear more plausible that the numbers of high-skilled immigrants are to a
considerable extent influenced by immigration policy. Australia and Canada organise
their economic immigration through ‘points systems’ which favour skilled immigra-
tion. By contrast, France and Germany have restrictive immigration policies that 
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3. See Düvell (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of the various estimates.DIVISIONS OF LABOURSETTING THE STAGE
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Figure 3: Tertiary-educated among foreign born
(Deviations from the OECD average of 23 percent in percentage points)
Source: OECD, author’s calculations
imply a low-skill bias. The reason for this low-skilled bias of restrictive policies is that
high-skilled migrants can usually find an alternative host country that will welcome
them with open arms so that there is little incentive for them to engage in irregular
immigration. By contrast, low-skilled immigrants often have fewer options and will be
tempted to find their way into a country despite tight restrictions even if this means
accepting an irregular status initially. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the high percentage of high-skilled immigrants
into the UK, where immigration policies for high-skilled migrants have been more
favourable for some time. In addition, it is obvious that English, as the world’s
international language, is an important asset for anglophone countries attempting to
attract a high percentage of skilled migrants. 
Internal migration and enlargement
In Table 1 we have seen that internal EU migration is relatively small. One reason is
that numerous small legal obstacles stand in the way of migration within the EU. For
example, the differences in the organisation of social insurance and welfare states
across the EU can turn portability of social entitlements into a nightmare. At the same
time, income differences within the EU15 are relatively small, and one would expect
15%
5%
-5%
-15%
PL AT IT DE FR NL ES DK BE
SE US KOR UK JPN NO NZ CAN IE AUSthis to reduce migration. Where income differentials within the EU are larger, as is the
case between the EU15 and the new member states, fairly substantial migratory
movements can be observed (Table 2, overleaf).
The changing regional pattern of migration from the new member states in eastern
Europe suggests that the selective application of the transitional periods across the
EU, and in particular the fact that Germany has taken a restrictive stance, has trig-
gered a substantial diversion of migration flows towards the UK and Ireland.
Interestingly enough, this does not hold true for the Scandinavian countries.
Although Sweden has opened its labour market completely, and Denmark to a great
extent, net migration flows into these two countries have been – at some 6,000 per-
sons – almost negligible in the first two years after enlargement. Language, and
perhaps differences in labour market institutions, might have played an important
role in shaping the direction of east-west migration flows.
It is striking that there has also been a substantial migration flow from Bulgaria and
Romania into the EU15 during the past few years, although both countries were not
part of the EU before 2007. Based on bilateral agreements, Spain admitted roughly
360,000 migrants from Romania and Bulgaria between 2000 and 2005. The number
of foreign residents from Bulgaria and Romania has also substantially increased in
Italy, but to a lesser extent than in Spain. Again, we see a diversion of migration flows.
In Germany, which had been the main destination for migrants from these countries
in the early 1990s, the number of residents from Bulgaria and Romania has declined
from 260,000 to 130,000 over the last decade.
The diversion of migration flows has influenced two subsequent policy decisions.
First, even those countries which opened their labour markets to workers from the
eight new member states of central and eastern Europe (‘NMS8’) at the beginning of
enlargement were reluctant to extend this free movement to Bulgaria and Romania
upon their accession in 2007. The fear of receiving an extraordinarily high share of
migrants from these countries certainly influenced the decision to keep the door
closed to Bulgaria and Romania in countries such as Ireland and the UK. Second, a
number of EU15 countries decided to open their labour markets to workers from the
NMS8 when the first two-year period of the transitional arrangement expired in May
2006
4. The rationale behind these policies is that second-mover countries, ie 
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4. Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain opened their labour markets completely, and some other countries
increased quotes and removed barriers at sectoral level (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). In recent
years, further restrictions have been lifted, including perhaps most significantly, the opening of the labour mar-
ket in France in the run-up to the French EU presidency.Table 2: Residents from the eight new member states of central and eastern Europe
in the EU15, 2000-2006
Notes: i). Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006; ii). Statistics Denmark (population statistics); iii). Statistics Finland (population sta-
tistics), 2006; iv). Statistisches Bundesamt (population statistics), all data refer to 12/31 of previous year. 2006 and 2005 not com-
parable to previous years due to data revision; v). 2002 population census; 2005: LFS, other values estimated; vi). 2004-06 ISTAT
(population statistics), 2000-03 Council of Europe, recent demographic developments in Europe; vii). Statistics Netherlands (popu-
lation statistics); viii). 2000-02 Eurostat Labour Force Survey, 2003-06 estimates and extrapolations; ix). Statistics Sweden (popu-
lation statistics, 31/12; x). Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006, national LFS data report for 2005 240,000 and for 2006 365,000
citizens from the NMS8 – statistical break (data revision).
Sources: National population statistics and Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006.
countries which open their labour markets after the others, receive only a relatively
small share of migrants. Given that regional migration patterns are relatively stable
over time – due in part to network effects, language barriers and the like – this
expectation is not unreasonable.
Although the key decisions on the transition towards full labour mobility in the entire
EU27 by 2014 have now been made, the recent enlargement experience is not just of
historical interest. It illustrates well the possible pitfalls of coordination failure, and
warns that if immigration from the highly educated and culturally close new EU
member states had the potential to be controversial, immigration may be even more
controversial from equally near but much poorer countries in the EU neighbourhood. 
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2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1,000 persons
Austria
i 60.4 44.6 41.0 53.7 80.5 78.9
Belgium
i 9.3 12.2 9.5 15.6 25.6 59.9
Denmark
ii 8.7 10.0 10.2 10.5 11.3 13.3
Finland
iii 12.9 14.8 15.8 16.5 18.3 17.8
France
i 37.8 44.9 35.1 43.0 46.8 29.6
Germany
iv 416.5 453.1 466.4 480.7 438.8
x 481.7
x
Greece
i 13.8 14.9 16.4 15.2 20.6 20.1
Ireland
v 6.4 8.6 49.1 54.1 58.5 58.5
Italy
vi 34.4 41.5 42.2 55.6 67.8 79.8
Luxembourg
i 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7
Netherlands
vii 9.4 11.2 12.2 13.1 17.9 23.2
Portugal
viii 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3
Spain
i 10.6 30.0 41.5 46.7 61.8 74.3
Sweden
ix 23.0 22.9 21.4 21.1 23.3 26.9
UK
x 52.7 62.0 78.6 81.4 180.8 328.6
EU15 697.3 772.3 841.1 909.0 1,053.4 1,293.5Proximity and income differences as drivers of migration
This type of proximity migration from much poorer countries in the neighbourhood of
the EU, similar to the massive influx of migrants from Mexico to the US, might well
play a much more important role for the EU in the future. It is estimated that there are
currently some 12 million Mexican immigrants living in the US, roughly 60 percent of
which illegally. The illegal inflow from Mexico may exceed 400,000 migrants per year.
Geographic proximity and the income gap with Mexico appear to be key drivers of that
development. As we have seen above, the EU numbers of between four million and
eight million irregular migrants and an annual inflow of up to 500,000 may already
be comparable. 
Figure 4: Income gaps of the EU15 and US with their respective neighbourhoods
Source: IMF data. 
Note: The unweighted average of current exchange rateand purchasing power parity is used for comparing GDP per capita.
In order further to assess the similarities with the US-Mexico situation, Figure 4 com-
pares the income gaps of the EU15 and of the US with their respective neighbour-
hoods using a synthetic conversion rate that is an average of the current exchange
rate and the purchasing power parity. The reason for this unusual choice of conver-
sion rate is that migration decisions are in part driven by purchasing power parity
15
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Figure 4 shows that the income gap between the US and Mexico is significantly
greater than between the EU15 and the 12 new member states which joined the EU
in 2004 and 2007. 
However, the US-Mexico gap of roughly a factor of five is very similar to the gap
between the EU15 and the average of EU accession and neighbourhood countries
around the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe. But Mexico only has around 100
million inhabitants, roughly one third of the US population. By contrast, the EU acces-
sion countries, the neighbourhood countries and Russia taken together have rough-
ly 500 million inhabitants, which is about the same as the population of the entire
EU27. Even when taking the larger population of the EU15 compared to the US into
account, the migration challenge in the EU neighbourhood for the EU can be said to
be three times as large as the migration challenge from Mexico for the US. Looking
further to Latin America from the US and to western, middle and eastern Africa from
EU15, the comparatively greater immigration potential for the EU is also apparent.
Yet Figure 4 does not capture the major effect of actually having a common border
which increases migration pressures further, as the example of the US and Mexico
illustrates. But even in that respect, US migration exposure is not without its parallel
in Europe. In particular, migration exposure between neighbouring Spain and
Morocco is extreme. However, some other countries in Europe are clearly much less
exposed to income differences with immediate neighbours. Figure 5 presents a clas-
sification of the migration exposure of EU27 by looking at both the income difference
with the poorest adjacent country and the GDP per capita level. 
Countries with high income levels but without poor immediate neighbours like the UK
or Denmark can be thought of as shielded immigration countries. They are attractive
to migrants because they are rich, but they are not particularly exposed to neigh-
bourhood migration pressures. Countries with high GDP per capital and
comparatively poor neighbours like Spain, Finland, and Germany are exposed immi-
gration countries. The reluctance of Austria and Germany to open their labour
markets to citizens from the new member states neatly illustrates this fear of greater
exposure. However, the migration diversion experience of the UK and Ireland sug-
gests that shielded countries may still attract many migrants if exposed countries in
between refuse to admit migrants. This leapfrogging of exposed but closed immigra-
tion countries is greatly facilitated by the availability of (up to now) cheap air travel
in the EU. 
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sThen there are relatively poor countries such as Poland and Romania bordering much
poorer countries still, like Ukraine and Moldova. These are potential immigration and
emigration countrieswhich face the challenge of managing both aspects of migration
simultaneously. These countries are also likely to be popular transit countries.
Finally, there are the countries with below-average income but without extremely
poor neighbours where likely migration pressures are more difficult to predict. 
Figure 5 also shows that very large income differences between neighbouring
countries within the EU (as indicated by the blue dots) have already become the
exception within the EU. They mainly concern Germany and Austria. By contrast, large
income differences across external borders of the EU (as indicated by red dots)
abound. This underlines the importance of developing a common policy for the immi-
gration of third country nationals. This is where the main net migration flows of the
future are to be expected, which will by far outpace those from the new member
states. If mishandled, these pressures could turn into large-scale illegal immigration
inflows, accompanied by growing public resentment in host countries. These illegal
immigrants might then further increase the need for coordination and harmonisation
within the Schengen area.
In sum, it appears quite certain that proximity and income differences will be impor-
tant drivers of migration for the EU. But what governance structure can the EU rely on
to manage these future migration movements?
Migration rules and governance
The control of external borders and decisions about who is allowed to enter and who
is refused entry is traditionally considered to be one of the core elements of the sov-
ereignty of a state. Against this background, it was a bold vision by the founding
fathers of the EU that citizens from any EU member state should be allowed to travel
without border controls and migrate across the entire EU with hardly any legal restric-
tions. The implementation of that vision is now nearing completion. Implementation
rests on two pillars: the free mobility for EU workers and the Schengen agreement. By
contrast, national policies with regard to the external entry and lateral movement
within the EU of third country nationals remain diverse. Only in recent years have
efforts towards greater coordination and harmonisation intensified in this area. 
Free mobility for EU workers
Free mobility for workers within the EU has been a basic principle of the European
18
DIVISIONS OF LABOURSETTING THE STAGEUnion since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. Over the decades, numerous
directives and court decisions have clarified and expanded the implications of this
right, which is now a central part of the legal definition of EU citizenship
5. In recent
years, free mobility for EU workers has increasingly been extended to include strong
rights of mobility for inactive EU citizens. In particular, Directive 2004/38 ‘on the
rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the member states’ has gone a long way towards establishing
free mobility for EU citizens, whether economically active or not. One of its key provi-
sions establishes that, after five years’ residence, even inactive EU citizens are
eligible for full welfare benefits in any member state
6.
When countries join the EU, their citizens also become EU citizens and, as a conse-
quence, also benefit from the right freely to move, reside and work anywhere in the
EU. If the state joining the EU is substantially poorer than the EU average, this can ini-
tially trigger significant migration flows. During the 2004 and 2007 round of enlarge-
ment, there were concerns in EU15 about the prospect of mass immigration from
eastern Europe. In order to address these concerns, the so-called ‘2+3+2’ rule was
agreed as a transitional arrangement governing labour mobility from new member
states. According to the agreement, EU15 member states were allowed to delay the
introduction of free movement for workers from the new member states in eastern
Europe
7 for a period of up to seven years in total. Any restrictions would have to be
reviewed after the initial two years and then after another three years with a view to
lifting the restrictions should they no longer be deemed necessary. A third extension
of the transitional period by a final two years is permissible in the presence of serious
imbalances in the domestic labour market.
Germany and Austria are particularly reluctant to lift restrictions, possibly on
account of their geographic proximity to eastern Europe, as we shall see below. But
irrespective of whether these restrictions may have made sense for some EU15
member states during a transitional period, they will have to be lifted soon. All restric-
tions on citizens of the eight new members states in eastern Europe which joined the
EU in 2004 (NMS8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia) will be lifted by 2011 at the latest. For the two new member
states which joined in 2007 (NMS2: Bulgaria and Romania) restrictions will be lifted
by 2014 at the latest. Since the focus of this chapter is on the future challenges
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5. Free mobility for workers has proven so attractive that EFTA countries like Switzerland are also joining in.
6. Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 16(1).
7. The new member states were also given the right to impose restrictions on EU15 member states, although such
reciprocal restrictions have mostly symbolic significance.posed by immigration from outside the EU, we will in the following take the internal
mobility for EU workers as given, although it will technically only be achieved by
2014.
The Schengen Agreement
In 1985 France, Germany and the Benelux countries concluded the Schengen
Agreement with a view to abolishing border controls at their joint borders. To address
some of the potential problems of such a move, not least with regard to third-country
nationals, the Schengen Agreement includes a number of additional provisions on
the harmonisation of external border controls, on policy co-operation between signa-
tories, and on the creation of the Schengen visa as a common visa for the Schengen
area.
By 2001, all member states of the then EU15 with the exception of the UK and Ireland
had joined and implemented the Schengen agreement. It is expected that by 2010
almost all of the new EU member states (and all EFTA countries) will have fully imple-
mented the Schengen Agreement. Therefore, travel without frontier controls at any
land border is rapidly becoming a reality throughout the entire EU27
8. In parallel with
the development of borderless travel inside the EU, steps were also taken to
coordinate asylum policy through the Dublin Convention, not least to prevent ‘asylum
shopping’.
Mobility of third-country nationals
The legal admission of third-country nationals as economic migrants to the EU
remains largely within the responsibility of individual member states. The admission
rules of member states are characterised by great diversity. The great variety of
admission schemes for high-skilled migrants may serve as an example that admis-
sion policies in different countries often have relatively little in common. 
Virtually all EU member states have special immigration schemes in place for highly-
qualified third-country nationals. Around half have schemes that go beyond highly-
specialised categories such as researchers, artists and intra-corporate transferees.
Among those with more extensive schemes, some use minimum salary thresholds
(which vary enormously between countries), others use skill criteria such as
20
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8. Although the UK and Ireland have opted out of Schengen, their only land border (between each other) has been
without formal border controls ever since Ireland became independent in 1922.academic degrees or past work experience. Some use a mix of the two. At least four
member states have several categories of high-skilled workers for which different
entry and/or residence conditions apply. The existence of a firm job offer or job con-
tract is not required in the UK but is in all other member states. Some countries
require that the employer demonstrate that no local can be found to fill the job, oth-
ers do not. Also, some countries admit those high-skilled immigrants who qualify for
admission on a temporary basis only or at least initially, others admit them on a
permanent basis. However, there is one important common feature of these different
schemes. They are generally so restrictive that the immigration inflow under these
schemes tends to be only a small fraction of total immigration. 
Member states are also relatively free to decide on the conditions governing status
changes for their migrants from third countries. Specifically, it is up to member states
to decide on the regularisation of irregular migrants, on the extension of temporary
work permits and on the conversion of temporary to permanent work permits.
However, some EU-level rules exist governing status transitions. Perhaps most
significantly, legal migrants are to be accorded permanent residence after five years
in a member state
9. Finally, member states set their own naturalisation rules. 
But to what extent can migrant status, once it has been established in one member
state, be transferred within the EU?  A stylised summary of transferability of migrant
status in the EU is given in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Transferability of migrant status within the EU
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9. With the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark which are not fully participating in this EU regime.
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sIrregular migrants can easily migrate from one country in the Schengen zone to
another and will still be irregular migrants there. In that unusual sense, their status is
fully transferable. By contrast, third-country nationals with a legal work permit gen-
erally cannot transfer that permit within the EU. Their residence and work permit is
only valid for the member state where it was issued. This limits their mobility inside
the EU, unless they are prepared to forgo their legal status and start working as irreg-
ular migrants in another EU country. Usually, such a step would be unattractive.
However, this option may become relevant when their legal stay is about to expire.
But this scenario has, in essence, already been captured by the observation that
irregular migrants enjoy status transferability within the Schengen area. 
By contrast, for third-country nationals with permanent work permits, an important
element of transferability of status has been introduced. Third-country nationals with
long-term resident status are to enjoy transferability of their status when they move
from one EU country to another, according to Directive 2003/109. However, this
directive will only become fully effective once the transitional restrictions on worker
mobility for EU citizens from new member states have been lifted between now and
2014. The legal reason for this is that no third-country worker must be given greater
rights of mobility than, say, an EU citizen from Romania whose mobility may be
restricted until 2014. And even after 2014 member states may impose restrictions
on the mobility of workers from third countries with long-term resident status on
grounds of labour market imbalances. It appears likely that a number of open ques-
tions in this area will have to be resolved in the courts over the next decade or so.
Ultimately, the only legal third-country migrants who currently enjoy full EU-wide
portability of status in their own right (and for their close family members who may
not be EU citizens) are naturalised EU citizens. 
EU migration governance
For future coordination and harmonisation of the diverse migration policies within
the EU towards third-country nationals, the EU governance structures matter greatly.
They have been substantially strengthened in recent years and stand to be further
reinforced if qualified majority voting on migration were to be adopted as part of the
currently stalled Lisbon Treaty. 
Before 1993 European cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs policy
(including migration) had essentially to be dealt with at the intergovernmental level
outside Commission and treaty structures. In 1993, justice and home affairs policy
was formally included under the so-called ‘third pillar’ of the Maastricht Treaty and
22
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least owing to dissatisfaction with progress under the weak structures of the third
pillar, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 submitted the area of border controls and migra-
tion policy to a decision-making procedure essentially in line with normal European
Community procedure (after a five-year transition period). The Amsterdam Treaty
also incorporated the Schengen Agreement into the European Union framework, with
the UK and Ireland retaining their right to opt-in selectively. 
In 1999 the European Council met for a special meeting in Tampere, Finland, in order
to provide the initial guidelines for the work in the area of freedom, security and
justice during the first five years under the Amsterdam Treaty. This Tampere pro-
gramme
10 called for the development of a common EU migration policy. It also sug-
gested that the legal status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in
the EU should receive mobility rights similar to those of EU nationals, resulting in the
cornerstone Directive 2003/109 already mentioned. 
The Hague programme
11for the period 2005-2010 is very much a continuation of the
Tampere programme, aiming to develop a common migration policy by 2010. In the
framework of that current work programme, the European Commission is preparing
five proposals for directives in the area of migration, covering the admission of high-
skilled migrants, temporary migrants, and intra-corporate transferees. More recently,
the French EU presidency has made immigration policy a priority, proposing a ‘pact
on immigration’ aiming at stronger EU-level coordination on both legal and illegal
immigration policy, external border controls, asylum and other policies closely asso-
ciated with immigration policy. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty presently in abeyance, the unanimity requirement for deci-
sions on border controls and migration policy would be replaced by qualified majority
voting. Further, the Commission would be granted the sole right of initiative in this
area. This streamlined decision-making process would certainly make it easier to
coordinate and harmonise migration policy in the EU and, as such, would appear to
be a desirable feature of any rescue package for the Lisbon Treaty. 
However, irrespective of whether or not the European decision-making rules are
eventually streamlined in the area of migration, the key analytical question is what
exactly should be regulated at the EU level, and why, and how. The next section dis-
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10.See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere, 15-16 October 1999.
11.See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Brussels, 4-5 November 2004.cusses some of the key arguments that are frequently encountered in the debate,
introducing a number of fundamental ideas that are important for the economic
analysis of migration in the process. Subsequently, these ideas are then used to help
identify policy priorities for the EU. 
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The economics of migration is highly complex but the public discourse rewards sim-
plicity. Therefore, both critics and advocates of immigration often rely on oversimpli-
fication when it comes to the economic impact of immigration. But it is difficult
meaningfully to explore the European policy options on such an oversimplified basis.
The main objective of this section is thus to add some layers of analytical complexity
which better do justice to the issues at hand. 
In order to do so, we first explore some of the most commonly used economic
arguments in favour and against a more open immigration policy. Specifically, we
examine the following pro-immigration claims: that immigration is desirable precise-
ly on the same grounds as trade; that immigration leads to economic growth and
therefore to greater prosperity of the host-country population; that ageing Europe
needs immigrants to cope with its demographic crisis; and that the proper
functioning of the EU’s common currency, the euro, requires more open immigration
policies. Subsequently, some of the most commonly used economic arguments
against an open migration policy are also examined. Specifically, we explore the like-
ly wage and employment impact of immigration, look at the impact of immigration on
the welfare state, and finally discuss the notion of a limited absorption capacity for
immigration. Overall, we find that while all these arguments for and against immigra-
tion may have some merit, on close inspection they typically turn out to be less
forceful than is often claimed.  
On the basis of this nuanced view on immigration, we then attempt to identify priority
areas for EU policy interventions, using a skill-based analysis. 
Pro-migration arguments
Economic migration can loosely be defined as any cross-border migration that
occurs in order to obtain a better-paid job. If pay is broadly in line with productivity, a
move to a better-paid job thus increases global economic output. This is the funda-
mental efficiency argument in favour of economic migration. But according to the fac-tor price equalisation theorem of classic trade theory, wages might in principle be
equalised and global economic output increased through the trade in goods alone. In
that view, trade and migration would be two ways of achieving the same thing. 
Migration and trade
Despite the occasional setback, the political reality of today is that trade policy is
generally guided by a vision of free trade worldwide. Also, global capital markets are
fairly integrated. Binding capital controls during normal times are out of fashion
although they can have a role to play during crisis situations. By contrast, migration
policies generally tend to be restrictive. This is why Faini et al. (1999) called migra-
tion the ‘great absentee’ of globalisation. Does it matter? That critically depends on
whether the factor price equalisation theorem is right and trade and migration are
really just two ways of achieving the same thing.
In practice, current levels of trade openness do not appear to be very effective at
equalising wages worldwide. As Table 3 shows, the wage differences between
countries for the same occupation remain very substantial. Earnings multiples of 10
are not unusual when comparing salaries using the current exchange rate. Clearly, it
is those high earnings differentials that are to an important extent driving economic
migration. 
One of the main reasons for these wage differences is not to be found in remaining
barriers to trade but in institutional differences between countries. Often, poor
countries are poor because of inferior institutions that reduce total factor
productivity. Despite recent development success stories, upgrading poor
institutions and thereby improving total factor productivity is a slow process.
Furthermore, the track record of successfully helping poor countries change their
poor institutions through outside development assistance is at best mixed. Hence, it
is not unreasonable to expect international quality differences in institutions to per-
sist for the time being. 
With this in mind, perhaps the decisive difference between migration and trade
becomes obvious. Migration provides people from poor countries with direct access
to better institutions whereas trade does not. This short-circuiting of the develop-
ment problem by allowing workers to move to a better location is at the heart of the
equity and the efficiency argument in favour of migration. 
Clearly, it is unfair that some children are born in countries with poor institutions
26
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ywhereas others are born into countries with good institutions. By allowing
international migration, country of birth and economic opportunity are to some
extent decoupled, reducing the inequality of opportunity. Furthermore, economic
migration stands to produce efficiency gains beyond what could be achieved through
free trade alone by moving workers to higher productivity environments. 
To the extent that the quality of institutions in the source and the host country are
not altered by immigration, this is a fairly robust argument for why freer migration
can contribute to increased global output even in the presence of trade. However, it
should be noted that migration sceptics often regard the very potential of mass
immigration to harm social cohesion and the fabric of the host country society as a
major concern. 
The precise extent to which free migration could and would increase world output is
very difficult to estimate. But according to Rodrik (2002), the potential from freer
migration might easily dwarf potential gains from further trade liberalisation if one
assumes that institutional quality is not hurt by immigration. And, using additional
somewhat heroic assumptions, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) even argued that free
migration might have the potential to double world output. 
In political economy terms, one would be inclined to interpret the observation that
the potential gains from the liberalisation of migration are probably larger than those
from lifting the remaining barriers to trade as an indication that, politically, it is some-
how more difficult to liberalise migration than trade. This is indeed the case, pointing
to a second key difference between migration and trade. The main winners of migra-
tion are typically the migrants themselves. However, by virtue of their migrant status,
they are systematically underrepresented in the host country that needs to decide
on the admission of migrants. And potential migrants that still reside in the source
country have even less opportunity to make themselves heard in the host country. 
By contrast, the gains from trade accrue to local citizens who have proper political
representation in their country. Of course, this representation may not be perfect. In
particular, if the losses from trade are concentrated more narrowly than the gains
from trade, opponents of trade may find it easier to organise themselves than the
beneficiaries so that there may also be a protectionist bias
12. But the political
economy bias is clearly against migration. Furthermore, it may often be politically
impossible to strike a deal for migrants to share some of their gains with natives in
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12.eg Grossman and Helpman (2002).the host country due to principles of anti-discrimination. In particular, it is generally
difficult for host country governments to access the gains from migration that accrue
to low-skilled immigrants in the absence of some form of tax or benefit discrimination
against migrants compared to similarly low-earning natives. 
In summary, we find that the efficiency case for migration critically depends
institutional differences between host and source country – and on the impact of
immigration on institutional quality in the host country (and indeed the source
country). Further, it has become clear that even if institutions were sufficiently
robust to sustain large-scale migration, the political economy of immigration is hard-
er because a large part of the grains from migration accrue to the migrants whose
political representation in the host country is often weak and whose rents may be
difficult to share with (potential losers within) the host country population.
Migration and growth
GDP growth is often used to make the case for migration empirically. For example, the
UK government defends its immigration policy before voters with the observation
that about 15 to 20 percent of output growth in the UK between 2001 and 2006 was
reportedly due to immigration. However, a recent House of Lords report on immigra-
tion has objected that a positive impact of immigration on GDP is ‘an irrelevant and
misleading criterion for assessing the economic impact of immigration on the UK’. 
The House of Lords Committee has an important point here. From a host-country per-
spective, a key question is whether the influx of immigrants helps or harms the
native population. In other debates, say on tax reform, GDP impact can and is legiti-
mately used as a meaningful yardstick to assess policies. Because GDP impact is
often a valid measure of policy impact, one might be tempted to believe this also
applies to immigration, which could explain why the UK government and others are
tempted to use it as such. 
To see why this argument is flawed, one simply needs to go back to the definition of
GDP which is, broadly speaking, the sum of all incomes. If there are more immigrants,
GDP is almost certain to go up simply because there are additional workers also earn-
ing an income. Logically, the only way for GDP not to grow when new immigrants
arrive would for immigrants to have to have an extremely negative impact on natives
– larger than the incomes that the immigrants themselves are earning. 
Empirically, such a scenario is not very plausible. As is discussed further below, the
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somewhat positive. Further adding the incomes of migrants simply makes that
growth impact stronger still. And even for those natives with the same labour market
profile as the immigrants, Borjas (2003) estimates that an influx of one percent of
immigrants reduces the wages of the natives in that bracket by only 0.3 percent. To
arrive at a worst-case scenario, one could ignore all income gains of natives who do
not compete with migrants in the labour market or who own capital. Further, one
could pessimistically assume that the average migrant only earns half of the average
native in the same age and qualification bracket. But even with these unrealistically
pessimist assumptions, an influx of one percent of immigrants would still lead to
positive GDP growth.
Just as GDP in the host country will almost automatically go up in response to migra-
tion, GDP in the source country will tend to go down no matter what. The income of
those who emigrate will simply no longer be counted towards the GDP of the source
country. However, just as the increase in GDP in the host country does not automat-
ically mean that immigration is good for the native of the host country, the decrease
in GDP in the source country does not automatically mean that those remaining in
the source country are worse off. 
To address this issue, it is sometimes proposed to instead use GDP per capita as a
suitable yardstick for the impact on host-country and source-country populations
instead. Clearly, this is a step in the right direction as it takes into account that migra-
tion changes the population numbers in both source and host country. However,
even GDP per capita can be misleading when it comes to the impact of migration. The
problem with GDP per capita is readily understood by looking at the impact on GDP per
capita of a migrant who earned an above-average labour income at home and earns
a much higher but below-average labour income abroad. This situation is in fact not
unusual because migrants are typically better educated than the average inhabitant
of the source country but in many instances still earn a below-average wage in the
host country. 
Since the migrant was an above-average earner at home, the nominal GDP per capita
in the source country will decrease even if we assume that the incomes of those who
remain in the source country do not change. And because the migrant is a below-
average earner in the host country, host-country GDP per capita will decrease with
migration even if we assume that the incomes of the native population in the host
country remain unchanged. In this situation, GDP per capita in the host country and
in the source country decrease although, by assumption, the incomes of the
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even goes up. The example we have constructed illustrates that even GDP per capital
will tend to be a misleading indicator of the benefits of migration for the immobile
population. 
For those reasons, any serious empirical analysis of the economic impact of immi-
gration and its desirability cannot rely on GDP figures alone. Instead, the incomes of
migrants and the immobile populations in the host and source country need to be
accounted for and looked at separately. In practice, this is not always easy due to the
poor availability of data. Also, some conceptual difficulties remain, such as the ques-
tion of whether the incomes of second-generation immigrants should be counted as
income of natives or incomes of migrants. 
But in spite of these difficulties we clearly need to improve upon host-country GDP
growth as a yardstick to assess the economic impact of immigration. 
Ageing and labour shortages
In the context of Europe’s rapidly ageing populations, it is sometimes also argued
that immigration is needed both to pay the pensions of natives and to fill the gaps left
by a rapidly retiring native workforce. 
We start to examine the argument by exploring the economic meaning of a ‘labour
shortage’. It means that for some reason there are more companies trying to hire
workers of a certain profile than are available at the prevailing wage for that profes-
sion. One straightforward solution to that problem would be simply to increase the
wage: as a result more people would become available in the job market and fewer
companies would want to hire, which would help the shortage to disappear. 
Alternatively, immigration restrictions could be relaxed in order to fill the vacancies.
This is not an uncommon policy approach. For example, France is explicitly relying on
estimates of labour market shortages for decisions about which sectors to open up
to workers from the new EU member states. However, the economic rationale for
selecting immigrants based on sectoral labour shortages is not that strong for at
least three reasons. 
First, the best and most reliable indicator that a profession is in great demand and
that the supply is scarce is a high wage. Therefore, if immigration policy is to aim at
alleviating scarcity in the labour market, it should first and foremost focus on high-
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Second, the number of vacancies in the labour market statistics depends on many
factors, some of which have little to do with any real shortage in the first place. For
example, the labour market turnover in the hotel, restaurant and leisure sector is tra-
ditionally among the highest. For a variety of reasons, people working in that sector
simply change jobs often. Because the turnover in that sector is high, the number of
vacancies in that sector is also higher than it would otherwise be. But it would cer-
tainly appear inappropriate for migration policy to target a particular sector simply
because staff turnover in that sector is high. 
Third, real labour market shortages in the sense of a sudden demand or supply shock
to which the wages do not respond instantaneously are almost by definition very
transient in nature. After a short interval, wages will typically adjust to the shock. This
is especially true of upward wage adjustments (which are needed to eliminate labour
shortages), to which there tend to be only few institutional barriers in market
economies. By contrast, migration is a long-term commitment for a host society, with
migrants typically staying on several years or even for their entire life. This mismatch
in time horizons between the phenomenon of labour shortages and immigration
makes it implausible that the two should be closely linked. 
However, things are somewhat more complicated still. The reason is that in many
industries there are large network effects and major economies of scale. When a new
industry emerges where local network effects and economies of scale matter crucial-
ly, one decisive factor for where this sector will locate is the rapid and ready availabil-
ity of workers at reasonable cost. For this reason, it is entirely conceivable that the
emergence of the automotive cluster in post-war Germany owed as much to
Germany’s ‘guest-worker’ programme as it did to the quality of German car engineer-
ing, as explained in Box 1. 
In conclusion, it can be said that labour-market policies driven by labour shortages
generally run a risk of being overly short-termist while diverting political attention
away from the true scarcity of high-paid and high-skilled workers. However, the real
world is more complicated. There have been occasions such as the emergence of the
German automotive cluster where the potentially flawed reasoning in terms of labour
shortages might have led to a policy that secured Germany a long-term competitive
advantage in this sector. 
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THE ‘GASTARBEITER’ EXPERIENCE AND THE GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE CLUSTER
Starting in the 1950s, the German coal, steel and automotive sectors wanted to
hire many more low-skilled manufacturing workers than were available at the
going wage. In order to address this shortage, the first formal guest-worker
(‘Gastarbeiter’) programmes were introduced in 1955. This involved the signing
of bilateral treaties with Italy, Spain and what was then Yugoslavia, and the
establishment of recruitment offices on the ground. In 1960, Portugal and Turkey
were added to that list. The original plan that guest workers should rotate was
increasingly opposed by employers who had little interest in continuously train-
ing a revolving workforce. By 1964, the rotation planning was formally aban-
doned. In the same year, Germany celebrated the arrival of its millionth guest
worker. 
By 1971, an estimated 10 percent of the total workforce in Germany was made
up of guest workers. In the key automotive sector, the percentage of the work-
force made up of guest workers routinely exceeded 25 percent. It seems entirely
conceivable that the emergence of Germany as the leading European cluster for
the automotive industry would not have been possible without the massive use
of immigrant labour. The automotive industry - then as now - is characterised by
major economies of scale. In the post-war period, transport and telecommunica-
tions links were not in a position to support massive outsourcing. In this setting,
guest workers may have given the German automotive sector a decisive compet-
itive edge by allowing it to scale up its production very rapidly without major
problems of runaway costs or the quality of the workforce.
German workers continue to benefit from the presence of this automotive cluster
today. This is often overlooked, as Germany is now trying to come to terms with
the significant social costs incurred as a result of the guest-worker experience
and the way the accompanying integration challenge was (mis)handled from
the 1970s to the 1990s. 
Of course, in the age of outsourcing and globalisation one would be hard pressed to
explain why a repeat of the low-skilled guest-worker programme would be needed.
But the lesson that dynamic sectoral clusters may often be easier to establish in an
environment that is open to immigration still holds. Silicon Valley would not be what
it is today without the enormous contribution of clever and enterprising immigrants.
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become the powerhouse of the global financial services industry if it had not been
able to attract foreign financial talent by the tens of thousands. 
Let us now turn to one particularly important variant of the labour shortage
argument, namely the demographic deficit. The basic idea is that massive immigra-
tion over the coming decades will be required because so many natives will retire but
not enough young natives will be available to take their place. This argument proves
to be problematic simply because the number of jobs in a country that need doing is
not fixed, as will be explored in detail further below when looking at the wage and
employment impact of immigration. By the same token, ageing does not automati-
cally lead to labour shortages. 
However, one could, in principle, imagine that fixed proportions between young and
more experienced older workers are needed for efficient production. In other words,
one could imagine that young and old workers are complements instead of substi-
tutes in which case there would still be a powerful case for immigration for
demographic reasons. However, a closely related question has already been studied
for the baby-boom years, namely whether the wages of largely baby-boom cohorts
were depressed and the wages of smaller cohorts before and after were inflated
13.  It
was found that this cohort wage impact for the baby boom was small, and certainly
minimal compared to international wage differences. Therefore, one would expect
that the changes in cohort size due to the ‘baby bust’ will also have a relatively
limited impact on cohort wages, which means that the demographic argument is
perhaps not that powerful. 
It may even be that Europe’s demographic crisis develops into a deterrent for immi-
grants. As we have already seen in many parts of the European countryside, ageing
can accelerate the exodus of young people. And at least for young high-skilled immi-
grants, it may not be particularly attractive to move to European countries that
impose a high burden on the young through unreformed pension systems. In that
sense, Europe should perhaps address its demographic crisis in order to attract
migrants rather than attempting to attract migrants in order to avoid the difficult
reforms necessitated by its demographic crisis.
However, the demographic argument should not be discounted entirely. Urbanisation
has been one of the most marked phenomena over the past two centuries in Europe
34
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13.Macunovich (1998).and across the world. In 1800, around 15 percent of the population in Europe was
urban. This percentage rose to roughly 40 percent in 1900 and 75 percent in 2000.
Globally, urbanisation has just reached the symbolically important 50 percent
threshold and by 2030 some 60 percent of the world’s population is expected to live
in an urban setting. 
Theoretically, urbanisation could be driven by either of two factors: migration from
the countryside to the cities and higher fertility in urban than in rural areas. But in
reality most urban settings are low-fertility environments. Effective fertility in many
urban areas has been below the replacement rate (the fertility rate at which the size
of each generation is preserved) for centuries. By contrast, high-fertility rural areas
have been the driver of population growth. 
Therefore, migration into urban areas has been and continues to be essential to
sustain and grow city populations. Historically, these rural-to-urban migration move-
ments have occurred within countries. However, rural populations in Europe now only
constitute 25 percent of total population (and substantially less in some EU member
states) and the fertility decline over past decades in Europe has essentially been a
rural phenomenon as illustrated with Austrian data in Figure 7.
Figure 7: The decline of rural cohort fertility in Austria
Source: Spielauer (2005)
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UrbanThe observed decline in rural fertility in industrialised countries raises the crucial
question: will we allow our cities to shrink at the risk of them becoming less vibrant
or should we allow the century-old pattern of migration from high-fertility rural areas
to low-fertility urban areas to continue through an influx of third-country nationals?
This seems to be the real demographic choice of immigration policy, at least to the
extent that migration flows can be effectively controlled by government. And if we
accept that economically vibrant cities are the key to economic prosperity, the
demographic argument would appear to have some merit, albeit perhaps for some-
what different reasons than is often imagined.
External immigration, internal mobility and the euro
Finally, one important argument in favour of external immigration into the euro area
in particular is that a currency area will greatly benefit from mobility across regions
to absorb asymmetric shocks. Unfortunately internal mobility within the euro area is
relatively low compared to mobility within the US and therefore asymmetric shocks
are more persistent and less readily absorbed
14. In additional to the remaining artifi-
cial barriers to internal mobility
15 this transatlantic difference can be explained by
language barriers and high sunk investments in specific locations in traditionally
less mobile Europe. 
In view of this low level of internal mobility, external immigration may be a powerful
substitute for internal mobility to assure the smooth functioning of the euro area. The
reason is that external immigrants will generally have close to zero differential immi-
gration costs between different EU countries (provided that the legal situation is the
same throughout the EU) because the fixed cost of moving does not vary much
depending on the exact location where the external immigrant settles. 
As shown in Figure 8, Ireland and Spain with their booming economies have experi-
enced particularly large inflows of immigrants in recent years, which has no doubt to
some extent helped to prevent divergences within the euro area. 
However, external mobility even on such a large scale is not sufficient to prevent
divergences altogether, as the examples of Ireland and Spain also illustrate. One rea-
son for this has probably been the key role of the property and construction boom in
both of these economies. In fact, high immigration, and consequently even higher
36
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14.Decressin and Fatás (1993), Blanchard and Katz (1992).
15. See for example Fenge and von Weizsäcker (2008).immigration expectations shown in Figure 9, may have played a role in fuelling the
property bubbles in Ireland and Spain, as argued in Ahearne et al. (2008).
Figure 8: Recent immigration flows to Spain and Ireland
Source: Bruegel
Figure 9: Population projection for Spain (UN 1996, INE 2005)
Source: INE and UN.
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Some of the key concerns regarding immigration are how it might affect social cohe-
sion and the quality of institutions in the host country, how it might adversely impact
the job prospects of natives, and how expensive immigrants might be for tax payers,
especially in countries with a generous welfare state. In the following, we briefly
explore all three arguments. 
Absorption capacity
As we have seen above, one of the main advantages of migration compared to trade
is that immigration grants immediate access to the generally better institutions in
the host country. But since the host society is bound to change somewhat as a result
of migration, so will, in general, the institutions. Hence, there may be a concern that
the very quality of institutions that attracts immigrants in the first place may suffer
as a result of immigration. A priori, it is of course also possible that immigration
might improve institutional quality further. But there is the widespread concern that
a rapid and substantial influx of immigrants, especially when it leads to the emer-
gence of an ethnic underclass, might endanger the social cohesion of a society and
thereby also its political and social foundations. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), for example, find that participation in social activities
is significantly lower in more ethnically fragmented US communities. Entorf and Lauk
(2006) identify significant negative peer effects of immigrant school performance
on overall school performance in Germany and Austria with their selective three-tier
school systems. However, it should not be forgotten that communities can also
benefit greatly from cultural and ethnic diversity. This goes far beyond the
hackneyed observation that the local restaurant scene will benefit from such
diversity. Clearly, large immigrant cities such as London and New York are thriving
not least because of the energy generated by immigrants, which includes cultural
diversity and entrepreneurial spirit. 
It is in this sense of social cohesion and institutional quality that the popular notion
of an absorption capacity for immigration might be interpreted economically.
However, it should be noted that the loss of social cohesion might often be a gradual
process so that it might be more appropriate to think about it in terms of social exter-
nalities rather than a binding capacity constraint. Also, it should clearly be borne in
mind that this social externality may well be positive for some immigrants while it
might be somewhat negative for others. 
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allocate a fixed number of immigration slots, say 100 000 per year, is flawed. The
number of migrants that a country is able to absorb is not fixed. In particular, the
immigration of high-skilled workers may in fact have a positive externality such that
the ‘absorption capacity’ for lower-skilled immigrants might increase as a result.
Such effects might explain why Australia and Canada seem to cope quite well with
around 13 percent of the population non-tertiary educated foreign-born, while in
France and Germany there are significant tensions with around 10 percent of the
total population non-tertiary educated foreign-born. Perhaps Australia and Canada
are finding it easier to cope with low-skilled immigration precisely because of their
much greater inflow of high-skilled immigration. This skill-based approach when
thinking about immigration proves to be equally helpful when thinking about the
wage impact of immigration.
Wage impact of immigration 
Conceptually, the wage impact of immigration can cut both ways. Wages of native
workers with labour market characteristics similar to those of immigrants can be
expected to suffer. By contrast, natives workers with different skills which are com-
plementary to immigrants and owners of capital can be expected to benefit. The net
effect on natives would be expected to be positive for a relatively wide range of
assumptions regarding the production function of the host country economy. Thus,
in principle, the native winners of immigration might be able to compensate the
native losers. However, in practice, this redistribution might not take place. Besides
non-economic concerns, this distributional problem could be one plausible economic
explanation why parts of the population might be critical of immigration. 
And it also offers an explanation why the skill distribution of immigrants may matter
for the political support of immigration. If the above logic is correct, low-skilled immi-
gration will tend to increase income inequality among the native population in the
host country as the already below-average wage of low-skilled natives will come
under additional pressure. By contrast, high-skilled immigration would have a benign
distributional impact in the host country, reducing the above-average wages of high-
skilled natives while increasing the below-average wages of low-skilled natives.
However, while this theoretical argument is simple and compelling, it has been
surprisingly difficult to find convincing empirical evidence to support it. In their
analysis of empirical surveys, Longhi et al.(2005, 2006) find only a minute ‘consen-
sus estimate’ of the distributional impact: a one percent increase in immigration only
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0.024 percent decline in employment. This would be a very positive finding which
might allow us to stop worrying about the distributional implications of migration on
the host country altogether. But is it too good to be true?
Some people think so. The reason is that immigrants typically flock to the most
vibrant cities that are undergoing rapid economic and job growth. Because of this,
immigration and wage and job growth in the local economy can be expected to be
positively correlated. Hence, any negative wage impact of immigration might be hid-
den by above-average wages in areas that manage to attract the largest numbers of
migrants.
By applying an econometric approach immune to this particular concern, Borjas
(2003) and Aydemir and Borjas (2006) obtain substantially higher estimates of the
wage impact of migration for the US, Canada and Mexico. According to these studies,
immigration of one percent reduces wages at the respective skill level by between
0.3 and 0.4 percent and migration could explain up to one third of the increase in the
wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled wages in the US over recent decades.
Furthermore, Borjas finds in a simulation that the net gains for natives in the host
country may be relatively small compared to the rather large distributional effects.
But that is not the end of the debate. 
First, Borjas’ critics point to episodes of mass immigration to limited geographic
areas that were not caused by rapid economic expansion. The Mariel Boat Lift (see
Box 2)  and the mass migration from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the early
1990s are two much-commented examples of rapid immigration caused by a
political decision to lift emigration restrictions in the countries of origin rather than
particularly dynamic economic conditions in the host country. The Mariel Boat Lift
increased the population of Miami by seven percent in 1980. And the migration from
the former Soviet Union to Israel increased the population of Israel by 12 percent
between 1990 and 1994. Surprisingly, it turns out that the impact of these mass
immigration episodes on the wages or employment of natives in Miami and in Israel
has generally been negligible
16, even in the short run.
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16.See Card (1990) for Miami and Friedberg (2001) for Israel.BOX 2: MARIEL BOAT LIFT
In April 1980, a diplomatic crisis had developed in Havana, which resulted in
thousands of Cubans taking refuge in the Peruvian embassy. To relieve the pres-
sure inherent in the situation, Cuban leader Fidel Castro declared that Cubans
wishing to leave for the US could do so from the port of Mariel. In the following
months until September 1980, when this window of opportunity closed again,
125,000 Cubans left Cuba via Mariel on boats chartered by Cuban friends and rel-
atives in the US. Roughly half of the migrants settled in Miami. This increased the
total work force of Miami by seven percent and the Cuban workforce of Miami by
20 percent within a very short time by historical accident rather than through the
strong economic pull of Miami compared to other cities.
Thus, the ‘Mariel Boat Lift’, as it came to be called, can be regarded as a particu-
larly instructive natural experiment that provides an opportunity to study the
labour-market impact of rapid immigration. It turns out that the effects on local
unemployment and local wages were surprisingly limited. Card (1990) finds that
the principal discernible impact on unemployment and wages occurred among
Cuban workers. He estimated that Cuban unemployment increased by around
three percentage points more than would otherwise have been expected, and
Cuban wages in Miami suffered a relative decline of around nine percent between
1979 and 1985. 
However, it appears that even the Cubans who had arrived before 1980 were not
strongly affected. Both the increase in unemployment and the decline wages
among Cubans in Miami are probably in large part due to a compositional effect.
The recent arrivals simply had higher unemployment rates and received lower
wages than those Cubans who had already established themselves. Therefore,
the evidence from the Mariel Boat Lift suggests that the process of adjustment
to this immigration episode imposed relatively little pain even on previous Cuban
immigrants which may have been expected to be the closest substitutes to the
newly arrived migrants. 
Second, Borjas’ critics point to a study by Ottaviano and Peri (2006), who decided to
re-run the estimates while allowing for the possibility that natives and foreign
workers are not perfect substitutes even within the same age and skill bracket. As a
result, they find that much of the wage impact of fresh immigration actually falls on
existing migrants rather than natives. As a result, they estimate that only a relatively
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from recent immigration, whereas the vast majority of natives has benefited
substantially. 
In conclusion, one can say that the literature has not yet been able comprehensively
to dispel the concern that especially low-skilled immigration might have some
adverse distributional consequences among native populations. At the same time, it
seems unlikely that any such impact would be very considerable. We can illustrate
this using the estimate of Borjas as a pessimistic benchmark. If the low-skilled pop-
ulation of a country were suddenly to increase by an enormous 10 percent, the low-
skilled wages of natives would decrease by between three and four percent. Such
orders of magnitude would not be negligible but could in principle be readily handled
by European welfare states. However, there are two reasons why a modest adverse
wage impact of immigration on low-skilled natives may not be entirely harmless. 
The first reason is that labour markets in the EU do not function very well at the lower
end of the skill spectrum. Specifically, on average in the EU, low-skilled
unemployment is about twice as high as high-skilled unemployment. One important
explanation for this is that wages which are already low cannot fall further because
there is an explicit minimum wage or an implicit wage floor implied by the welfare
state, as is the case in Germany. In the presence of such a wage floor, an immigra-
tion-induced adverse wage impact may translate into additional unemployment. It is
therefore not surprising that a combination of frictional unemployment and difficul-
ties in wage adjustment can also lead to an unemployment impact of migration. 
However, the unemployment impact on natives is typically not very large and is also
to a large extent temporary, as suggested for example by Jean and Jimenez (2007).
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that a considerable part of the unemployment
burden that arises temporarily or, less often, permanently as a result of immigration
is borne by the immigrants themselves. 
Table 4 compares the unemployment rates of native with foreign-born workers by
skill level. The pattern is fairly straightforward. In Europe, the unemployment rates of
natives are consistently higher for foreign-born than for native workers – in many
cases even twice as high or more. In that sense, immigrants do bear a disproportion-
ate part of the unemployment burden. In classic immigration countries like the US,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the labour market performance of foreign-born
relatives to natives is generally more similar to that of natives. While skilled migrants
also have substantially higher unemployment rates than skilled natives, their
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Table 4: Unemployment rates (in percent) of native and foreign-born by education
Source: OECD database on immigrants
While it may on the one hand be politically reassuring for the host country that the
unemployment impact of immigration is to a great extent borne by immigrants them-
selves,  the next question inevitably concerns the fiscal impact of immigration. 
Immigration and the welfare state
The concern that immigrants will pose a burden to the welfare state is of particular
relevance for Europe where welfare states are relatively large. However, even for
Europe the empirical evidence turns out to be inconclusive. In a study for the
Netherlands, Roodenburg et al. (2003) find a negative net impact of immigration on
public finances. By contrast, Bonin (2002) finds that the average immigrant has a
positive net fiscal impact in Germany across his or her lifecycle.
At first glance, it may seem surprising that the net fiscal impact of immigration in a
country like Germany might be positive. After all, the skill-mix of immigrants is par-
ticularly low as we have seen in the previous section, the labour market performance
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Native-born Foreign-born Total
unemployment
rate Primary Tertiary Primary Tertiary
Netherlands 4.3 1.5 9.7 4.3 3.0
Sweden 4.1 1.7 10.3 6.4 3.5
Denmark 5.1 2.2 10.7 6.0 3.8
USA 13.7 2.2 10.5 3.4 5.7
UK 7.3 2.9 11.3 5.6 5.8
Austria 9.9 2.2 14.0 6.7 6.4
New Zealand 10.9 3.3 11.9 6.1 7.1
Australia 10.4 2.7 10.8 5.7 7.3
Canada 11.8 4.6 8.6 6.9 7.4
Ireland 14.6 3.5 18.1 7.5 8.7
Germany 11.9 3.9 21.6 12.7 9.0
Belgium 14.1 4.5 26.5 12.2 10.5
Italy 13.6 6.4 14.4 9.5 11.6
France 17.1 6.6 24.2 11.9 12.8
Spain 16.2 9.6 17.8 13.4 14.1of immigrants is poor (Table 4) and the German welfare state is relatively generous.
All these factors should make migrants relatively large net recipients of the welfare
state. However, this reasoning overlooks one major feature of European welfare
states. They not only redistribute from rich to poor but also redistribute on a massive
scale from the working-age population to the inactive population and to pensioners in
particular. Since immigrants are typically young adults when they arrive, the host
country saves costs for their upbringing and their schooling, which has already been
paid for by their country of origin, and taxes them to fund the transfers to pensioners.
Of course, part of this transfer will be paid back to them in the future when they in
turn retire. But since the net present value of their pension contribution tends to be
much higher than the net present value of their acquired pension claim, young immi-
grants may be net contributors to the welfare state even if their earnings are below
average and they are more likely than natives to become unemployed. 
However, despite these age-specific effects of public pension, health and long-term
care insurance there is little doubt that Europe is fiscally more vulnerable to a large-
scale influx of low-skilled immigrants than the US on account of Europe’s more
generous welfare state. This potentially reduces the EU’s optimal degree of openness
to low-skilled immigration compared to the US. 
At the same time, young high-skilled immigrants may not find it particularly attrac-
tive to move to European countries which impose a heavy burden on the young
through unreformed pension systems. For this reason, the hope of attracting immi-
grants to avoid the politically difficult reforms necessitated by Europe’s demographic
crisis may to some extent be dashed. As already argued above when exploring the
demographic argument, Europeans will probably need to deal with the demographic
crisis hanging over our pension systems first in order to attract those sought-after
high-skilled immigrants, rather than hoping that they will flock to our countries to
sustain otherwise unsustainable pension systems. 
Priority areas for EU policy
Having developed a more nuanced view on the economic impact of immigration, we
now attempt to identify priority areas for future EU immigration policy, and ultimately
derive concrete policy proposals. We proceed by first exploring systematically the
main areas of immigration policy that are also identified in the proposed ‘immigra-
tion pact’, namely: legal immigration policy, irregular immigration and border con-
trols, asylum policy and integration policy. Then, in the subsequent section we look
at concrete policy instruments and their relative merits in order ultimately to arrive
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to implementation than the plethora of policy suggestions that tends to emerge from
a traditional holistic approach. 
We now look at the different policy areas in turn, starting with legal immigration.
Legal immigration
The considerations above suggest that the overall impact of high-skilled immigration
on the host country population is likely to be positive in essentially all member
states of the EU. By contrast, the net impact of low-skilled immigration is less certain
and more varied among member states due to institutional factors, including the gen-
erosity of the welfare state, the flexibility of the labour market and the quality of the
existing human capital. Brücker and von Weizsäcker (2007) have explored this
further using a simple general equilibrium simulation. As shown in Figure 10, they
find a fairly similar and consistently positive impact for high-skilled immigration
among member states and a much more varied and often somewhat negative impact
of less-skilled migration. 
Figure 10: Impact on host country by immigrant skill level
Source: Brücker and von Weizsäcker (2007)
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eFor the time being, the spill-over effects among legal immigrants can be expected to
be relatively small even within the Schengen area. The reason is that the legal immi-
gration status of third- country nationals only becomes ‘portable’ between member
states after five years of legal residence within the EU, and even then some legal
obstacles remain. After five years of residence within one EU country, immigrants
have usually already made a substantial investment in a local social network and
have aged somewhat, both factors reducing their propensity to move on. While in
principle there would always be the possibility for legal migrants to move and work
within the entire Schengen area on an irregular basis even before five years have
elapsed, any such move that led to a loss of legal status would typically be
unattractive. 
Therefore, harmonising legal immigration policies overall should not be regarded as
an urgent priority at the EU level. This point is reinforced by the observation that pref-
erences among member states regarding low- and mid-skilled legal migration can be
expected to differ substantially. However, there is one important exception – high-
skilled immigration – where preferences among member states are generally much
better aligned and where a common European solution could make Europe
significantly more attractive in the global competition for talent.
The EU is already falling behind in attracting high-skilled migrants, while countries
like Canada and Australia are particularly successful in attracting foreign-born grad-
uates through points- based immigration systems. This fact was already illustrated
by Figure 3 showing that the percentage of the university-educated among foreign-
born inhabitants is substantially below the OECD average for the typical EU country.
Positive outliers in the EU are the English-speaking countries Ireland and the UK and
to some extent Sweden. 
There is little doubt that English-speaking countries do have a substantial advantage
when it comes to attracting high-skilled immigrants for at least two reasons. First,
many young ambitious migrants are attracted to English language universities not
only because of the quality of teaching but also to perfect their knowledge of the
lingua francaof this globalised age. Second, those high-skilled migrants who pursue
their studies at home usually learn English as their first foreign language to a high
level, so that a subsequent move to an English-speaking country minimises their
linguistic migration cost. 
Unfortunately some countries tend to draw the wrong conclusions from this language
handicap. For example, the fact that Germany finds it more difficult to attract high-
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simply has a lower demand for high-skilled immigrants and therefore does not even
need to create a competitive legal framework to attract them. A case in point was the
debate about the German 'Green Card' designed to attract high-skilled IT workers.
When that German Green Card failed to attract as many applicants as was originally
planned, the popular interpretation was that Germany simply did not need high-
skilled foreigners and, even to the extent that it did need more high-skilled workers,
it would be far preferable to educate Germans better for those high-paying jobs. 
It transpires that this interpretation, variants of which are also frequently voiced in
other EU countries, is doubly flawed. First, it ignores the fact that non English-
speaking countries will need to offer high-skilled immigrants at least as attractive
conditions of entry as English-speaking countries to compete successfully. Second,
it overlooks the fact that the high-skilled often like to live and work in clusters. As a
result, the ability to attract foreign talent can help to grow knowledge economy
hotspots like Silicon Valley or the City of London, from which high-skilled natives
greatly benefit. Had California instead insisted on staffing Silicon Valley exclusively
with home-grown talent, it is seems likely that the global IT hotspot might simply
have been created elsewhere. 
Fortunately, the EU and the non English-speaking member states in particular are
increasingly recognising that much more attractive entry conditions for high-skilled
immigrants are needed for the EU successfully to participate in the global competi-
tion for talent. The recent flurry of national attempts to improve the legal basis for
attracting high-skilled migrants, including the recent 'carte des compétences et tal-
ents' in France, illustrate the progress that has been made in this debate. 
However, there is one important feature that purely national initiatives will not be
able to offer: immediate access to the entire EU labour market. For highly specialised
immigrants this would undoubtedly be attractive. In particular, it would make
migrants hesitate less about accepting a first job in a small or a non English-speaking
member state. For example, an Indian high-skilled migrant with a job offer in Vienna
will accept it much more readily if this guarantees access to the entire EU labour mar-
ket. In the case that the first job turns out to be unattractive after all or the family has
difficulties adjusting, the option value of being able to transfer to, say, Düsseldorf or
Manchester (and not just within Austria to, say, Innsbruck) would be substantial. 
Perhaps the most serious policy concern about an EU policy to attract high-skilled
immigrants more effectively is its prospective impact on the source country by way
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potential of the source country’s economy by depriving it of its innovation potential.
Also, by reducing the domestic supply of skill, the skill premium in developing
countries might increase, thereby leading to greater inequality. Furthermore, the
fiscal impact of high-skilled emigration will generally be negative.
However, brain drain may not be entirely negative for the source country. The option
to emigrate may substantially increase the expected returns on education, thereby
improving private education incentives. Also, if migrants return to their country of ori-
gin - and many of them do - the skills and savings that they have acquired abroad can
become a powerful force for development. Moderate levels of brain drain, therefore,
may actually be beneficial for the source country as is argued, for example, by Beine
et al. (2003). 
Further, the explosion of tertiary education in developing countries over the last 15
years as presented in Figure 11 has dramatically increased the supply of skill in
developing countries. In particular, the number of students in the ten most populated
developing countries (Pop-10) has trebled, increasing from 16 million in 1990 to 49
million in 2005, now dwarfing the number of students in the EU, North America,
Australia and New Zealand combined which in 2005 only amounted to 38 million.
This rapid increase in the supply of skill is likely to have reduced the potentially
adverse effects of brain drain for any given level of emigration. In fact, certain devel-
oping economies even have difficulty in properly absorbing the rapidly increased
supply of university graduates, leading to shockingly high unemployment rates
among them in countries such as Morocco. 
Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, Europe may wish to combine attempts to com-
pete more effectively for high-skilled immigrants with measures to mitigate any neg-
ative impact of brain drain, as elaborated in the policy section below.
Overall, it can be said that while the harmonisation of legal migration should not be
regarded as a European policy priority, an exception should be made for high-skilled
migration in order to strengthen Europe’s position in the global competition for talent. 
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Source: World Bank Edstats. Terminology: EU Greater Neighbourhood = EU Neighbourhood Policy Countries+EUAccession
Countries+Balkan Countries+Turkey+Russia, Pop-10: ten most populated developing countries which are China, India, Indonesia,
Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam and the Philippines; North America + Antipodes = Canada, USA, Australia, New
Zealand
Irregular migration
Unlike legal migrants, irregular migrants do not have a legal status to lose when they
move around within the Schengen area. This de facto mobility of irregular migrants
within the Schengen area gives rise to substantial spillover effects. For example, an
estimated 50 percent of the irregular Ukrainian migrants in Portugal entered the EU
with a Schengen visa issued by the Austrian or German embassies
17.
The argument for coordination of irregular migration is further strengthened by the
expectation that immigration pressures are set to increase in the coming years, as
argued above. But how will Europe respond to this expected further divergence
between the number of migrants hoping to enter the EU in search of a better life and
the number of immigrants that EU member states are willing to absorb? 
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17.See Baganha et al. (2004).The most important remedies that are routinely put forward to fight irregular migra-
tion are better border enforcement, more development assistance for countries of ori-
gin, and new legal migration schemes. However, while some of these measures can
make sense, they are unlikely to be able comprehensively to address the problem of
irregular migration which is why a European agreement on a path to legalisation
should be part of any policy package dealing with irregular migration.
Better border enforcement: The EU is already engaged in joint enforcement efforts to
reduce irregular migration. The control of the external borders is to be strengthened
which is what the new EU agency Frontex is concerned to do. Efforts to fight human
trafficking are to be further ramped up. And there are plans to intensify the quest for
closer collaboration with major transit countries. In addition, plans to intensify the
repatriation of irregular migrants are being developed, supported by new technology
such a biometric visa for identification and agreements with countries of origin as
well as transit countries. Irregular migrants generally do respond to incentives and
therefore it is likely that a comprehensive set of enforcement measures will succeed
in reducing the inflow of irregular migrants. However, it should not be overlooked that
the underlying economic forces that drive irregular migration are so powerful that
migrants are prepared to risk their lives on tiny boats trying to come to EU. Therefore,
it is also clear that stricter enforcement activities stopping short of an iron curtain at
the external borders and a police state within will only be able partially to address the
problem of irregular migration. 
To form an idea of the order of magnitude of the reduction in irregular migration that
strengthened enforcement and verification requirements can achieve, it is instruc-
tive to look at the analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (2007) on the likely
impact of the (currently stalled) Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act 2007. It
was estimated that the comprehensive set of enforcement measures in this immi-
gration reform bill would succeed in reducing the influx of irregular immigrants by
about 25 percent. Arguably, the external borders of the EU are already more tightly
guarded than the US border with Mexico. So to the extent that there are diminishing
returns to border controls, Europe could even be expected to have a harder time
reaching an reduction in irregular inflows of 25 percent by means of tighter controls. 
What is clear, however, is that better enforcement can contribute to addressing the
challenge of irregular migration. But the commonly held view of the general public
that enforcement alone might be able to settle the problem of irregular migration is
clearly flawed, since a large inflow of irregular migrants can be expected to continue
even in the presence of tight controls. For reasons of political hygiene it is important
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Increased development assistance: The argument is often advanced that increased
development assistance could be used to create better economic prospects in the
key countries of origin so that the incentive to emigrate would be reduced. However,
it transpires that even if increased development assistance were reliably to lift
incomes in the countries of origin, the effect on migration flows might turn out to be
ambiguous. The reason is that the level of income in the country of origin and the
propensity to emigrate may well be hump-shaped
18. Rising incomes may initially
increase the likelihood of emigration. One reason for this could be that poor and cred-
it-constrained individuals will only find migration affordable above a threshold
income level. Only once income has grown beyond that threshold would the likeli-
hood of migration go down on account of reduced income differences between
source and host country. In view of the substantial uncertainty with regard to the
impact of development assistance on migratory movements in the short and medi-
um term, it would seem imprudent to couple development assistance and migration
policy in the political discourse. 
Legal migration schemes: Also, it is sometimes claimed that a suitable means to
combat irregular immigration could be the expansion of legal immigration schemes,
possibly in the form of temporary or circular migration
19. For example, temporary
migration schemes are to be an integral part of the ‘mobility partnerships’ that the EU
plans to conclude with source countries, not least to reduce the inflow of irregular
migrants. However, it is not clear how effective this would be. If we assume that the
enforcement activities against irregular migration are at all meaningful, then the pool
of potential irregular migrants kept out of the EU is likely to be much larger than the
number of actual irregular migrants.  For the sake of argument, assume that every
fourth potential irregular immigrant manages to enter the EU. With this assumption,
four potential irregular migrants would have to be admitted legally to reduce the
number of irregular migrants by one. And this optimistically assumes that the four
legal migrants would indeed come from the pool of potential irregular migrants, which
is not necessarily the case. For the sake of argument, one could imagine that these
four legal migrants would compete with irregular migrants on the labour market so
that the wages of irregular migrants would be depressed and the incentive to migrate
irregularly would be further reduced. However, since regular migrants tend to work in
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18.See eg Adams and Page (2003)
19. See the introduction of the OECD Immigration Outlook 2008 for a critical assessment of circular migration
schemes.different labour markets, the wage interaction between the two is likely to be
relatively small. 
In this context it is worth noting that the Congressional Budget Office (2007) also
estimated the impact of a temporary legal immigration scheme that was to be part of
the bill on irregular migration. Their estimated impact suggests that the problem of
increased visa overstay as a result of the temporary migration scheme would have
almost entirely cancelled out the reduction of irregular migration that could other-
wise have been achieved through tighter border controls and enforcement. 
In other words, it is safe to expect the number of irregular migrants to fall by much
less than one for each additional legal migrant. And in the case of temporary immigra-
tion schemes, the number of irregular migrants may even increase substantially in
response to the temporary legal migration channel, as convincingly argued by the
Congressional Budget Office. Once this is widely understood, the political appeal of
legal immigration schemes for the sole purpose of reducing irregular migration is
likely to be greatly diminished. 
Path to regularisation: While tighter controls can reduce the influx of irregular
migrants, realistically none of the above approaches is likely to make the problem of
irregular migration disappear any time soon. Therefore, EU member states need to
find a pragmatic way to accommodate any residual irregular migration in ways that
are compatible with human rights, basic law and order and the requirements of inte-
gration policy as will be elaborated further below.
However, because of cross-border spillover effects, reinforced controls and
regularisation policies will need to be coordinated at the European level. Owing to
different legal and immigration traditions and the diversity of economic preferences
regarding the predominantly low-skilled irregular migrants, agreeing on a European
solution will not be straightforward. However, in the following section it will be argued
that, by choosing the right balance of repressive measures combined with humani-
tarian standards and paths to regularisation, a common European policy on irregular
migration may well be within reach. 
Asylum
In asylum policy, the importance of cross-border spillovers, not least in the form of
‘asylum shopping’, has already been widely recognised and has already led to far-
reaching coordination at the European level (eg the Dublin Convention
20 and Dublin
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21). With the end of the Cold War, the EU experienced a rapid surge in asylum appli-
cations, as can be seen in Figure 12. In response, member states progressively tight-
ened their asylum legislation and also started progressively to introduce EU regula-
tion to govern asylum within Europe. Hatton (2008) estimates that these tighter and
better coordinated rules have contributed to about one third of the recent decline in
asylum applications, the other two thirds being attributable to a decline in the
demand for asylum especially from citizens of eastern European countries and the
countries of the former Soviet Union. 
Figure 12: New asylum applications in the EU
Source: Eurostat
The legal tightening and the remarkable success in reducing the asylum application
numbers (and to a lesser extent the number of people granted asylum) raises the
question of whether today Europe still does full justice to its ambition to provide shel-
ter to people who are in need of protection. Compared to other industrialised
countries, this fear may look exaggerated with Europe continuing to receiving about
three quarters of asylum claims among industrial countries.
At the same time, it is also clear that some countries within the EU are prepared to
take on substantially more asylum seekers than others. It particular, Sweden’s
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sperformance is remarkable, taking on over ten percent of total asylum claims
received in industrialised countries in 2007, a not-so-distant second place behind
the US and well ahead of much larger EU countries such as Germany, France, and the
UK which historically took on more asylum seekers than Sweden. To an important
extent, this is driven by the fact that of the 45,200 Iraqi asylum claims lodged in
2007, 41 percent were submitted to an accommodating Sweden. 
This raises the question of whether countries like Sweden would be able to continue to
pursue such timely and generous policies under more tightly harmonised EU-level
asylum rules. One approach to resolving this might be to regard generous asylum
policy that upholds European values as a European public good that can best be pro-
vided through joint financing of asylum expenditures, giving member states better
financial incentives to sustain asylum policies in line with European values. From this
public-good perspective, it could for example make good sense to provide Sweden with
EU funds to help sustain its generous asylum policy towards Iraqi refugees.
A concrete policy proposal along these lines will be discussed in the next section. 
Integration
Because the mobility of legal immigrants from third countries remains relatively low,
each member state can expect to bear the overwhelming part of the cost caused by
failed integration policies for legal migrants. Furthermore, differences between
member states in the composition of immigrant populations, institutional differ-
ences, not least in education and labour markets, and subtle differences in outlook,
reduce the prospect for far-reaching EU legislation in this area. As a consequence,
refining policies for mid-skilled and low-skilled immigration as well as integration
policies should mainly be regarded as a national priority for the time being. With
regard to integration policy, EU effort should be largely restricted to facilitating the
exchange of information and joint learning, providing political momentum to national
integration policies, and enhancing their quality without EU legislative action. 
This might of course change if at some stage it were decided significantly to lower the
period of time, currently five years, that third country nationals have to have enjoyed
legal residence in one member state before they start to be able enjoy internal mobil-
ity within the EU. However, we would regard attempts to accelerate legal mobility for
low- and mid-skilled third country nationals as unwise, precisely because such a
move would force EU member states into the difficulty of having to coordinate issues
where they have very different preferences. 
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For the three areas identified in the previous section (high-skilled legal immigration,
irregular migration, and asylum policy) concrete policy proposals are now developed.
In developing these proposals, we also reflect on how they could fit with the current
immigration agenda of the French presidency. 
High-skilled migration
The main European policy priority in the area of high-skilled migration is successfully
to introduce a European Blue Card
22 for high-skilled immigrants. The European
Commission’s draft directive on the creation of a European Blue Card recognises the
need for Europe to participate more effectively in the global competition for talent and
takes an important step in the right direction. However, a careful reading of the draft
directive reveals that it would be almost as difficult to transfer to a second member
state with an existing Blue Card acquired in the first member state as it would be to
apply for a fresh Blue Card in that second member state.
This relatively low degree of guaranteed portability of the Blue Card within the EU
labour market, coupled with the short initial validity period of the Blue Card of two
years, risks undermining its international competitiveness as illustrated in Figure 13
(overleaf). The US Green Card and the special H1B Visa for high-skilled immigrants to
the US not only grant access to the entire US labour market, their initial period of
validity is also more generous. In order for the EU Blue Card to become more attrac-
tive, its portability among member status needs to be improved and its initial period
of validity ought to be extended.
22.See von Weizsäcker (2006) for an earlier ‘Blue Card’ proposal that coined the term.Figure 13: The Blue Card needs improved durability and portability of status to be
competitive
However, there is little hope that an agreement among member states could be
reached to strengthen portability on the basis of the current access criterion for the
Blue Card of 1.5 times the minimum wage in the member state in question. A Blue
Card that can be obtained merely on the basis of, say, €750 monthly earnings in
Romania is unlikely ever to be accepted throughout the EU. A more promising
approach would be to allow skill and other migrant characteristics to determine eligi-
bility for a Blue Card jointly with a salary threshold. Ideally, this would be achieved
through a points system (see also Box 3 for the Canadian example). On that basis, it
ought to be much easier to agree on a Blue Card that would grant access to the entire
EU labour market in a more meaningful way.
Also, more could and should be done to attract high-skilled migrants by strengthen-
ing the attractiveness of European universities, which to some extent also requires
European policy action as argued in Aghion et al. (2007). In the US, the quality of its
leading universities is one of the most important channels by which to attract top tal-
ent early. After their studies, foreign-born students in the US benefit from a special
contingent of H1B visas to allow them to stay on in the US and work. A similar feature
could be introduced on the basis of the Blue Card in the form of a ‘Blue Diploma’,
allowing foreign-born graduates with a Masters degree (or equivalent) from a partic-
ipating university to find a job in the EU without being subject to the normal salary
threshold of the Blue Card. Such a comprehensive and predictable arrangement would
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Durability of immigrant statusBOX 3: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN POINTS SYSTEM
In a 1947 speech, the long-serving prime minister of Canada Mackenzie King
stated a position on immigration that a non-negligible number of voters through-
out Europe would still agree with today: “I wish to make it quite clear that Canada
is perfectly within her rights in selecting persons whom we regard as desirable
future citizens. It is not a ‘fundamental human right’ of any alien to enter Canada.
It is a privilege [...] The people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immi-
gration, to make any fundamental alteration in the character of our population.”
Based on that argument, Canada continued migration policies that strongly
favoured immigration from a number of (northern) European countries and dis-
couraged immigration from Asia for another 20 years.
However, public pressures in Canada were mounting to end such ultimately racist
immigration policies and under the visionary prime minister Lester B. Pearson
the government commissioned a white paper (1966) to explore what a non-
racist immigration policy might look like. Interestingly, the white paper worries
about the possibility that ‘ghetto-like slums’ with ethnic migrants in the larger
cities might emerge that would offset the advantages of increased cosmopoli-
tanism. Ultimately, the introduction of a points system was recommended for
Canada as a racially neutral but skill-based immigration policy. This recommen-
dation was implemented by the Pearson government in 1967, arguably
introducing the first race-neutral immigration system worldwide. 
The points system has worked reasonably well over the decades and has been
adjusted from time to time. One remarkable opportunity for Canada arose when
Britain handed back Hong Kong to the Chinese and the Thatcher government
decided to provide only 50,000 British passports to the around 5 million Chinese
inhabitants of Hong Kong. The UK government argued that such a strict stance
was required in order to avoid ethnic tensions. This provided the race-neutral
Canadian immigration system with an opportunity to show its strength, attract-
ing over 250,000 immigrants from Hong Kong between 1986 and 1997. With the
benefit of hindsight and in view of the rapid rise of China in the global economy,
most people would agree that Canada’s points system got it right, and the UK and
Europe as a whole missed a golden opportunity.
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ket afterwards. In principle, it would make sense to extend the Blue Diploma pro-
gramme to universities outside the EU. To start with, the top 100 non-European
universities, as measured by academic excellence, should also be included in the
scheme.
In addition to a strengthened Blue Card, member states may wish to consider invest-
ing in complementary measures such as expatriate infrastructure in order better to
compete for talent. Sought-after high-skilled migrants often have a choice between
different destinations. One important but often neglected determinant of their ulti-
mate migration decision is the availability of expat infrastructure such as suitable
foreign language schools for their children. Since most high-skilled migrants have a
good command of English, availability of suitable expat infrastructure tends to be an
especially important criterion for moves into non-English speaking countries. The
expansion of such expat infrastructure well beyond national capitals where it is
currently concentrated is an example of a national measure that could usefully com-
plement any EU effort on high-skilled migration.
To address concerns about brain drain, Europe may wish to consider two specific
measures designed to mitigate any adverse development impact of the Blue Card.
First, an opt-out from the Blue Card could be offered to any developing country con-
cerned about brain drain
23. Second, the EU could make a point of offering financial
support for tertiary education to developing countries with particularly high rates of
high-skilled emigration to the EU, an area of the education system that is often neg-
lected by donors since the Millennium Development Goals rightly focus mainly on
primary and to a lesser extent secondary education. 
Beyond that, Europe could already go a long way towards gaining the moral high
ground simply by fulfilling its commitments significantly to increase development
aid as a percentage of GDP. Finally, from a development perspective it makes good
sense to include clauses in migration legislation that facilitate brain circulation of the
high-skilled migrants between the home and host country. If made sufficiently
permanent, the Blue Card could in fact act as an insurance policy for high-skilled
migrants wanting to return to their country of origin. If a high-risk career project at
home does not work out, they would still have the option to come back to Europe. 
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23. However, it is less clear whether this opt-out should also be extended to governments that, according to the con-
sensus view, fail even remotely to act in the best interests of their citizens, as may currently be the case in
Zimbabwe.Irregular migration
Next, we explore the second priority area of irregular migration. As a result of the
divergence between the number of relatively low-skilled people wanting to come to
Europe and the number of migrants EU member states are willing to admit legally,
irregular migration is set to increase. 
First, more stringent standards governing the treatment of irregular migrants could
be agreed. With open internal borders, some member states might otherwise be
tempted to drive irregular migrants away to neighbouring EU countries by treating
them poorly. Individual countries that treat irregular migrants decently might in any
case end up attracting more than their expected share. Stricter standards for the
decent treatment of irregular migrants could help resolve this problem. Second, a
basic framework for regularisation procedures could be defined, recognising the
advantages of timely regularisation as opposed to sporadic mass regularisations. In
particular, it is often overlooked that irregular immigrants who are regularised in one
member state have a strong incentive to stay there because their legal status is ini-
tially not transferable. This provides an incentive for migrants to build themselves a
local network and to learn the local language.
In doing so, the effective mobility costs of those regularised migrants increase
substantially. In that sense, a country that regularises irregular migrants to some
extent locks them in, thus reducing spill-over effects.
This effect may have been overlooked in the debate regarding Spain’s recent mass
regularisation. France was concerned that a substantial part of the regularised
migrants would stay in Spain for five years only in order then to obtain long-term res-
ident status and move to France. However, because of the lock-in effect outlined
above, it is a priori unclear whether France will actually experience a substantial net
increase of immigrants in response to the Spanish policy in the long run. 
A more proactive regularisation policy stands to alleviate future integration
problems. It took European societies too long to acknowledge that their guest
workers were immigrants who required an integration investment. There is a risk that
we are today making a similar mistake with irregular immigration. Instead,
regularisation schemes should be used to provide incentives for rapid integration,
providing accelerated regularisation for those irregular migrants who rapidly acquire
language skills, display other characteristics that are conducive to rapid integration
or require rapid regularisation for humanitarian reasons. By contrast, irregular
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much longer period and be exposed to the generally small but non-negligible risk of
forced repatriation. 
Whether such an ‘earned regularisation’ approach would increase or reduce the annu-
al inflow of irregular migrants compared to the presently widespread approach of
sporadic mass regularisation depends greatly on the respective detail of the two
schemes. But in any event, combining the stronger reinforcement measures likely to
be proposed by the French presidency with earned regularisation offers an attractive
opportunity largely to take the anarchic and therefore politically corrosive element
out of policies dealing with irregular immigration. At the same time, the ‘earned regu-
larisation’ approach could help to achieve the declared objective of the French presi-
dency of doing away with mass regularisations, while offering the flexibility that may
be needed to accommodate the concerns of countries like Spain that view the pro-
posal of the French presidency in this area with some scepticism. 
Asylum: towards a ‘new Nansen’
The time might have come for the larger countries of the EU to start paying a human-
itarian dividend after having put in place necessary control and coordination
systems to restrict the abuse of asylum. To start with, this could take the form of a
European commitment proactively to offer 25,000 (or 0.05 percent of the EU popula-
tion per year) extra people refuge from persecution and war. Rather than waiting for
these refugees to arrive at our borders, such a proactive commitment could include
transport logistics where needed. These additional 25000 humanitarian migrants per
year could be offered a new Nansen passport. The previous incarnation of the Nansen
passport was introduced by the Norwegian polar explorer and Nobel peace prize win-
ner Fridjof Nansen to equip refugees from the Russian revolution with travel papers.
Naming the programme after a Norwegian would also make good sense since it
would be desirable to include non-EU members of the Schengen area such as Norway
in the programme. 
The funding of this scheme could be organised at the European level so that there
would be no fiscal disincentive for member states to accept these humanitarian
migrants. At regular intervals, there could be a European debate on how to best to use
this additional humanitarian quota (and whether to increase it in response to an
acute humanitarian crisis). In a sense, Wolfgang Schäuble’s recent call to grant priv-
ileged access to the EU for Christian Iraqi refugees could be regarded prototypical for
the kind of debates one would be having at the European level, involving difficult but
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decision-making. In this particular case, it is true that while Christian Iraqis might be
at relatively high risk in Iraq, at the same time this proposal may fit all too well the
world view of those who already regard the Iraq disaster as a clash of civilisations.
Irrespective of one’s opinion of this particular proposal, the prospect of regularly hav-
ing this kind of very concrete debate at the European level as part of the proposed
programme would clearly contribute to strengthening Europe’s humanitarian
identity. 
In any event, the proposed 'new Nansen' scheme could be a complement to any
efforts designed to streamline asylum criteria at the EU level, preserving substantial
room for manoeuvre to respond to exceptional humanitarian situations. 
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